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Questioning the Role of the Indian Administrative Service in National 
Integration 
Dalal Benbabaali 
 
 
Abstract. After Independence, the Indian Administrative 
Service was expected to promote national integration, 
from a social as well as a spatial point of view. Yet, 
despite the reservation policy, this elite body lacks 
representativeness. The partisanship of IAS officers along 
caste, religious and ethnic lines has further reduced their 
efficiency as a binding force of the nation. Being an All-
India Service, the IAS encourages the spatial mobility of 
its members, which is not always welcome by officers 
posted in far-off states or in disturbed areas. In these 
places, the vacancy of postings in the higher 
administration is a sign of desertion that is contrary to the 
IAS mission of territorial integration. 
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[1] The Indian Administrative Service (IAS) is a prestigious colonial legacy. Its precursor, 
the Indian Civil Service, was often referred to as the ‘steel frame’ of British rule in India1. After 
Independence in 1947, it was still considered a premier institution for maintaining national unity, 
in a regionally fragmented country with a number of princely states yet to be integrated. The 
Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar Patel (1875-1950), saw the importance of having a uniform 
administrative structure and wanted to organise it on a nationwide basis with the central 
government having a considerable control over it, to counterbalance the emergence of centrifugal 
forces that could lead to the disintegration of the Indian Union2. These proposals were strongly 
opposed by the Chief Ministers of the states, who wanted no interference with their authority. 
They favoured the State Civil Services over the All-India Services, which they saw as contrary to 
the federal principle. But the trauma of the Partition between India and Pakistan pointed to the 
necessity of providing for a strong centre. 
[2] National integration is a double task, not only territorial but also social. While the 
contribution of the IAS to territorial integration can be assessed through its capacity to contain 
divisive and separatist aspirations, its role in promoting social integration is partly related to its 
level of representativeness. Today, there are 5,000 members of the Indian Administrative 
Service, the highly respected IAS officers, in a country of more than one billion people. The 
recruitment of this elite body has been democratised through a policy of reservation that 
guarantees a quota system to the ‘backward’ castes, traditionally underrepresented in the 
administration. The Report of the Backward Classes Commission states: ‘By increasing the 
representation of Other Backward Classes in government services, we give them an immediate 
feeling of participation in the governance of this country’ (Government of India 1980: 57). 
[3] The importance of having representative bureaucracies in democratic regimes has 
been highlighted by Kingsley (1944), who questioned the classical Weberian theory of the 
bureaucrat as an impersonal, discretionless ‘single cog in an ever-moving mechanism which 
prescribes to him an essentially fixed route of march’ (Weber 1946: 228). For Kingsley, the 
neutrality of the bureaucracy is a myth. Administrators come from specific social classes and their 
                                                
1 The expression ‘steel frame’ comes from Lloyd George’s speech of 1922 in the British Parliament: ‘If you 
take that steel frame out of the fabric, it would collapse. There is one institution we will not cripple, there is 
one institution we will not deprive of its functions or of its privileges; and that is the institution which built up 
the British Raj – the British Civil Service of India’.  
2 In his speech to the Constituent Assembly in October 1949, Sardar Patel said: ‘You will not have a united 
India if you do not have a good All-India Service which has independence to speak out its mind’. 
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behaviour is influenced by their social origin. The only way to avoid the partiality of the 
bureaucracy is to make it ‘democratic’, which means ‘representative of the groups it serves’ 
(Kingsley 1944: 305). But is there a necessary linkage between the social background of the 
administrators and the way they take their decisions in office? Mosher (1968) doubts it and 
establishes a distinction between ‘passive (or sociological) representation’ and ‘active (or 
responsible) representativeness wherein an administrator is expected to press for the interests 
and desires of those whom he is presumed to represent, whether they be the whole people or 
some segment of the people’ (Mosher 1968: 11). 
[4] In the Indian context of a highly heterogeneous and divided society, where social, 
religious or regional sense of belonging is sometimes extremely strong and exclusive, ‘active 
representativeness’ of the bureaucracy might be a threat to rather than a tool of national unity. 
The summing up of the multitude of special interests seeking effective representation in the 
bureaucracy does not constitute the general interest. The different private interest groups within 
administration are often conflicting and their strengths vastly unequal. The effectiveness of the 
IAS as a binding force of the nation is thus not only related to its representativeness, but also to 
its inner cohesion. IAS officers like to portray themselves as a ‘new caste’ characterised by a 
strong esprit de corps and horizontal solidarity, but how far is this claim upheld in practice? 
[5] This paper aims at assessing the level of integration within the IAS, as well as its 
capacity to promote national integration in the country. These are two related, though distinct 
questions. If the bureaucracy is itself divided along caste, religious and regional lines, can it 
contribute to promote social equality, communal harmony and balanced regional development? 
To answer these questions, it is relevant to examine not only the social and geographic origins of 
IAS officers, but also their attitudes, outlook, set of values and overall culture. The statistical 
analysis presented here is based on primary data collected through a questionnaire addressed to 
a sample of 50% of an IAS batch of around a hundred persons3, as well as informations 
regarding a larger pool of officers (500), available in the electronic database of Lal Bahadur 
Shastri National Academy of Administration (LBSNAA), the IAS training institute, which keeps a 
                                                
3 The sample is representative of the whole batch in terms of gender, rural/urban breakup, and 
administrative category (Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Other Backward Class, General). To 
preserve the anonymity of the respondents, the exact year of the batch is not given, but it is one recruited 
between 2003 and 2006. 
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record of all recruits’ particulars4 since 2001. The quantitative analysis is completed by qualitative 
interviews conducted with members of the IAS both under training and in office5. 
 
I. Recruitment: representativeness versus meritocracy? 
[6] In 1854, the British rulers introduced the principle of open competitive examination for 
entry into the Indian Civil Service (ICS). Although Indians had a right to sit for it, the only 
examination centre was in London and the system operated as a bar to those who could not 
afford to travel so far. The Indianisation of the ICS started only in 1922, when the entrance 
examination was held simultaneously in Allahabad, under pressure from the Indian National 
Congress. However, the ICS continued to be dominated by the British, and it was often 
denigrated as ‘neither Indian, nor Civil, nor Service’. The ‘Brown Sahibs’, as the Indian civil 
servants used to be called, were in a difficult position. During the non-cooperation movement, 
they were tempted to align themselves with their white masters6. Hence, after Independence the 
loyalty of ICS officers was suspect. Public opinion was generally hostile to the ICS in view of its 
identification with foreign rule and its obstructing role during the freedom struggle. But Sardar 
Patel, the leader of the conservatives in Congress, did ultimately succeed in forcing his proposals 
down the throat of an unwilling Constituent Assembly. He advocated the importance of 
administrative continuity for the stability of the country. Finally, the institution was maintained 
under a new name, the Indian Administrative Service. 
[7] From enforcement of law and order and collection of revenue, the post-independence 
civil service has grown as an important tool for implementing national and state policies of welfare 
and planned economic development. These new tasks and objectives led to an increase in the 
size of the bureaucracy. There was an urgent need to organise new recruitments after the 
depletion caused by the resignation of British civil servants and the emigration to Pakistan of 
many Muslim officers. Since Independence, the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC), in 
charge of the centrally-organised recruitment, conducts every year a combined civil service 
                                                
4 This database is confidential but I was kindly allowed to access it for research purpose. It comprises 
personal information on recruits, such as gender, age, place of birth, administrative category, religion, 
educational background, marital status, language used for written and oral entrance examination.  
5 These interviews were conducted during my stay in LBSNAA for one whole year as a French teacher in 
2003-2004, and during shorter stays in the next two years as a researcher. I also interviewed senior 
officers posted in the field. 
6 ‘As a rule the foreign government can rely upon the ‘native’ civilian to be more zealously oppressive than 
even the average Anglo-Indian official’ Aurobindo Ghosh, 1908 (quoted in Gupta 1996: 29). 
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competitive examination on a nationwide basis. The minimum qualification demanded of eligible 
candidates is a Bachelor’s degree in any discipline from any recognised university. Half of the 
seats are reserved for the depressed classes. The reservations for Scheduled Castes (SC) and 
Scheduled Tribes (ST) are equal to their proportion in the total population, respectively 15 and 
7.5%. The Other Backward Classes (OBC), who are more than half the Indian population, have 
benefited since 1993 from 27% of reserved seats, as the quota totals should not exceed 50%, 
according to a Supreme Court order aiming at preserving the merit principle. Affirmative action for 
SCs and STs is a constitutional provision and is relatively well accepted by the rest of the 
population, since it has never threatened to revolutionise the social order. In contrast, the 
extension of civil service quotas for OBCs at the beginning of the 1990s created violent reactions 
among the upper castes. They protested against the loss of their hegemonic position in the higher 
administration, which they regarded as their monopoly, and against the challenging of a socio-
political order they had always dominated. Their anger lessened as the opening up of the Indian 
economy was offering them new avenues for employment in the private sector. But in 2006, the 
project of Manmohan Singh’s government to extend the reservations for OBCs to the higher 
educational institutes (the Indian Institutes of Technology, the Indian Institutes of Management, 
the medical colleges), and to the private sector, gave a new impetus to the anti-reservation 
movement. Upper caste students argue that the quota system is contrary to the merit principle 
and jeopardises performance. 
[8] In the administration, the argument of meritocracy versus reservations is very 
controversial, since the objective is to make the bureaucracy both efficient and representative. In 
fact, the candidates recruited through reservations are no less meritorious, since they are also 
selected through an extensive and rigorous examination process. The civil service competitive 
examination takes place in three stages during one whole year. The preliminary test was 
introduced to weed out non-serious contenders among the 100,000 candidates who sit for it every 
year on average. Only 10% are selected for the main examination, which consists of written 
papers, some compulsory, like English, one Indian language, and one essay, and some optional, 
which the candidates can choose from a long list of subjects taught in the universities. After this 
second stage, 10% of the candidates are again selected, which means that approximately one 
thousand people are called for the final stage, the oral interview. It is a personality test conducted 
by an expert panel which judges the candidates’ motivation, presence of mind, and leadership 
qualities, apart from their intellectual capabilities and aptitude for the work involved. In this final 
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round of elimination, half of the candidates are declared successful. Ultimately, less than 0.5% of 
the candidates are selected and only the higher ranking can opt for the Indian Administrative 
Service, leaving the less prestigious services to the others7. 
[9] During the interview, the only stage of the competition when the candidates lose their 
anonymity, some people complain of discrimination, not directly because of their social 
background, but because of their choice to speak in their mother tongue instead of English. Yet, 
this choice has been authorised since the 1970s for the 18 regional languages officially 
recognised in the 8th Schedule of the Constitution. The objective was to broaden the social and 
geographic basis of the recruitment, by enabling people without access to English education to 
compete. The preference of the examiners for English-speaking candidates, according to many 
recruits, might be motivated by purely academic and professional reasons, but some people 
interpret it as a bias in favour of the urban middle-class candidates, who are  already 
overrepresented in the IAS. 
 
II. Educational profile, social and geographic origins of IAS officers 
[10] The recruits of the IAS belong to an educational elite, as well as a social elite, since 
even the lower caste candidates are usually part of the ‘creamy layer’8. From the primary level, 
there is a gap between the urban middle-class children who are sent to private English-medium 
schools, preferably to Christian missionary schools, and the rural children who attend the village 
public schools, and who are taught in vernacular. Two-thirds of the IAS officers of the surveyed 
sample did their primary education in cities, whereas 72% of the Indian population live in rural 
areas. 40% of the IAS officers studied in private schools, half of them in convent schools. One 
third studied in English-medium schools at the primary level, but two-thirds at the secondary level. 
[11] As far as higher education is concerned, 60% of the interviewed IAS are post-
graduates, holding a Master’s degree and sometimes even a PhD, whereas a simple graduation 
is enough for eligibility in the civil service examination. Those who fail at the first attempt, in fact 
                                                
7 There are however two other prestigious services, the Indian Foreign Service (IFS) and the Indian Police 
Service (IPS), for which the candidates generally opt as a second choice just after the IAS. 
8 The ‘creamy layer’ is now an official category defined by strict criteria of annual income and occupation 
(sons and daughters of higher civil servants, of judges of Supreme Court and High Courts, of large 
landowners, and so forth). The concept does not apply to SC and ST candidates who can still benefit from 
reserved seats even if they belong to this category, but OBC candidates coming in the creamy layer are 
not entitled to reservations. 
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the majority, and who want to sit again for the examination, generally pursue their studies in the 
meantime. That is why so many candidates are overqualified at the time of selection. The 
average age of entry into the civil service, which is now 27 years, has increased because of 
longer studies. The age limit for eligibility has been progressively extended to 30 years (with 
concessions for reserved categories), while it was only 24 during the two decades following 
Independence. Until the 1980s, the university profile of the IAS officers used to be homogeneous 
and primarily based on humanities (Subramaniam 1971). But among the IAS recruited between 
2001 and 2005, only one third were arts graduates, 13% science graduates, the majority holding 
a professional degree, with 25% engineers, 15% medical doctors, 8% managers (MBAs) and 6% 
lawyers (LBSNAA database). Economic reforms and more remunerative employment 
opportunities in the private sector were expected to make the civil service less attractive. Yet, the 
prestige of the civil service is still very high, and its members enjoy a status and influence in 
society that compensate for their comparatively low salaries9. Some young professionals even 
quit their job to join the IAS. As one of them states: ‘Even if I become the CEO of my company, I 
am still a nobody in the eyes of the public, I have no social recognition on a large scale. When I 
go out, I am anonymous. But as an IAS, if I go to visit a village, the whole population will be out to 
welcome me’. Others explain that they wanted to have a professional degree to be able to find a 
job in case they could not succeed in the civil service examination. 
[12] A trend that has gained momentum in the past decade is the growing importance of 
private coaching classes to prepare for the civil service examination. The fees are usually high 
and infringe upon the merit principle of the recruitment by reducing its socio-spatial basis. 
Candidates who cannot afford it, or who live far from the metropolitan cities where these coaching 
centres are available, find themselves increasingly at a disadvantage. That is why the state 
governments are now developing their own coaching centres, generally free of cost for the 
underprivileged classes, to give equal opportunity to all candidates. More than one third of the 
IAS recruited since 2001 have a rural background (LBSNAA database), even if it is still far from 
being representative of the whole Indian population, who is mostly rural. 
[13] In the 1950s and 1960s, most of the high-level civil servants were drawn from the 
well-off urban classes and belonged to the upper castes. While they form less than 6% of the 
                                                
9 Even though IAS salaries increased between 1991 and 2001 (Das 2005), they are still much lower than 
those of their counterparts in the private sector. While an IAS officer starts with a salary of 15,000 rupees 
per month, an engineer can easily get twice this am
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Indian population, Brahmins were long overrepresented in the IAS where they occupied 40% of 
the seats on the average (Subramaniam 1971). The Brahmin hegemony in the higher civil service 
was challenged by the introduction of reserved seats for OBCs in the 1990s. After the Brahmins, 
the most represented in the IAS used to be the literary castes of scribes (Kayasth). Coming next 
were the upwardly mobile landowning castes who had invested in their children’s education. 
Some of them were later classified as OBCs, but the prosperous agrarian dominant castes are 
not entitled to reservations. They are nevertheless well represented in the IAS. In the beginning, 
the quotas for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes were rarely filled, due to lack of qualified 
candidates. With the spread of education among them and the emergence of a middle class 
coming from lower castes, the reserved posts are presently being filled. In the surveyed sample 
of 50 IAS officers, 6 were Brahmins, 5 Kshatriyas (mostly Rajput), 4 Banias, 10 from agrarian 
dominant castes (Jat, Bhumihar, Kamma), 15 OBCs (Kurmi, Yadav, Naidu, Christians and 
Muslims), 7 SCs (Chamar, Mahar, Mala) and 3 STs (Banjara, Irukala, Kishan). 
[14] Forming the bulk of the Indian population (82%), Hindus are overrepresented in the 
IAS, with 88% of recruits in average (LBSNAA database). The Christian, Sikh and Jain minorities 
are also overrepresented, whereas Muslims are clearly underrepresented in the IAS, with less 
than 3% of recruits, while Islam is the religion of 12% of the population. The underrepresentation 
of Muslims in the IAS has historical reasons, since after the Partition a large number of Muslim 
elites left India for Pakistan. Moreover, the Muslim community invested more in trading jobs than 
in education, maybe out of fear of discrimination in white-collar jobs. Muslim teaching institutions 
suffer from their poor adaptability and from the decline of Urdu, their literary language. 
[15] The vast majority of IAS officers comes from the middle class. In the surveyed 
sample, 30 declare that they belong to the lower middle class, and 13 to the upper middle class. 5 
say that they come from rich families and 2 from poor families. In order to verify these statements, 
which are based on self-perceptions, the officers were asked about their father’s occupation. As 
shown in Figure 1, only one person belongs to the working class, whereas 9 hail from business 
families. 7 are children of middle or rich landowning farmers. For 11 of the interviewed officers, 
the father’s occupation belongs to the lower intellectual professions (clerks, school teachers), and 
for another 8 to the higher intellectual professions (professors, doctors). 14 are sons or daughters 
of civil servants, which reveals the existence of social reproduction. But the merit principle of the 
competitive examination also allows upward mobility, as the sizeable number of officers whose 
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parents are farmers, clerks and teachers suggests. 
 
Source: personal investigation on an IAS batch sample. 
[16] After Independence, there were hardly any women in the higher civil service. Now 
female recruits represent approximately one fourth of each IAS batch, and their profile is more 
elitist than the average. They are often top rankers in the civil service competitive examination 
and come mostly from the well-off urban classes and upper castes. Among the women recruited 
in the IAS between 2001 and 2005, less than 15% had a rural background, as against 43% 
among the men (LBSNAA database). 
[17] There are striking imbalances regarding the distribution of IAS officers by state of 
origin (Figure 2). The recruitment on a national basis aims at selecting the best talent available in 
the whole Indian territory regardless of the geographic origin of the candidates. However, for an 
All-India Services designed to contribute to national integration, it seems important that each of 
the different states should have an adequate representation. 
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[18] Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar are relatively poor states but are well 
represented in the IAS, because in these states the prestige of the civil service is very high and 
many candidates try their luck every year by sitting for the examination. As a Bihari officer 
explains: ‘After my graduation from Patna university, I left Bihar for Delhi where I did a Master 
degree at the Jawaharlal Nehru University while preparing for the civil service examination. Many 
of my classmates in Patna did the same because there are very few jobs in the private sector in 
Bihar, and there the civil service commands a lot of respect’. By contrast, states like Gujarat, 
Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh are more developed, their educational structures are better, 
and thus their success ratio in the civil service exam might be higher, but there are fewer 
candidates since these states offer many other avenues for employment to their best students, 
who can take up private jobs. That is why there is no clear connection between the development 
level of a state and its representation in the IAS. 
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[19] Among the overrepresented states, Tamil Nadu is more urbanised than the average. 
Statistically candidates with an urban background appear more and have a higher success ratio 
in the civil service examination. That is why Delhi and Haryana, as well as Chandigarh, a fully 
urbanised territory, are still strongly overrepresented in the IAS, even after the development of 
regional universities has counterbalanced the share of Delhi in the recruitment of IAS officers. 
The states with an important tribal population like Chhattisgarh and Orissa, as well as the North-
Eastern states, are strongly underrepresented, except Meghalaya and Mizoram, where Christian 
missionaries have encouraged education of the ‘tribal’ indigenous groups, who were thus able to 
benefit from the quotas for STs. 
[20] The profile of IAS officers is very diverse, even if this elite body is far from reflecting 
the diversity of the whole Indian population. What has been examined up to now is the ‘passive’, 
or sociological, representativeness of the IAS, which can be measured in statistical terms. One 
has to turn now to the question of ‘active’ representation, which cannot be measured 
quantitatively, but can be assessed through interviews and observation of individual behaviour. 
‘Passive’ representation plays an important role in national integration, especially at the symbolic 
and psychological level, since the different social and regional groups get the feeling that they 
participate indirectly in public affairs. As the Report of the Backward Classes Commission states, 
‘when a backward class candidate becomes a Collector or a Superintendent of Police, (...) the 
psychological spin off of this phenomenon is tremendous; the entire community of that backward 
class candidate feels socially elevated. (...) The feeling that now it has its ‘own man’ in the 
‘corridors of power’ acts as morale booster’ (Government of India 1980: 57). 
[21] But the role of ‘active’ representation is more ambiguous. How far can administrators 
coming from specific social or regional groups actively represent the interests of their community 
once vested with power? Is the bureaucracy not supposed to serve everyone in society even-
handedly in the interest of the general public, without showing any partiality or favouritism? The 
first rule of conduct of the IAS officers is indeed to act with strict impartiality and objectivity. 
During the extensive debate for the framing of the Constitution, Sardar Patel made it a point that 
civil servants should be politically neutral and should preferably work outside their state to avoid 
interference from their community members. Political neutrality, fight against casteism, 
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regionalism, communalism10: such is the IAS ethic of public service. But how far is it upheld in 
practice? 
 
III. Training in the National Academy of Administration: promoting social and regional 
intermingling 
[22] Once recruited, IAS officers undergo compulsory training at Lal Bahadur Shastri 
National Academy of Administration (LBSNAA) in Mussoorie, a small town in the foothills of the 
Himalayas. Before the relocation of the institute in 1959, they were trained in Delhi. There has 
always been considerable bureaucratic pressure in favour of bringing the Academy back to the 
national capital (Maheshwari 2005). But Delhi is already a crowded metropolis, and the 
governmental policy is rather to keep away the new entrants to the civil service from the Central 
Secretariat, where they would be exposed from the very beginning to the existing factions and 
lobbies in the administration, and tempted to evince interest in matters of postings and 
promotions. More importantly, IAS officers belong to an All-India Service basically designed for 
the states. Training them at the seat of the central government would be unwise, since an initial 
stay in Delhi would encourage the already existing trend of asking for a deputation to the Centre 
when not satisfied with a posting in the states. 
[23] Under British rule, the members of the Indian Civil Service were given a high 
standard of training at the East India College of Haileybury in England (Mason 1985). Now, IAS 
officers are sent for a one-year course at the Academy of Mussoorie, where they are taught 
public administration, law, economics, history, geography and one Indian language apart from 
their mother tongue. But beyond this academic course, the faculty members, who are often 
themselves IAS officers, try to develop an esprit de corps among their young colleagues, in spite 
of their different backgrounds. They encourage the IAS probationers coming from different 
regions to mingle, as reflected in the rules of room allocation in the hostels. A North Indian 
probationer generally shares his or her room with a South Indian, and they sometimes need to 
use English to be able to communicate. Many of them say that their stay in the Academy is their 
first exposure to the diversity of the Indian population. 90% of the probationers of the surveyed 
                                                
10 Communalism is the term used in India to describe the exclusive feeling of religious belonging which 
leads to the violent exclusion of other religious communities.  
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sample have never left their home state before higher education. But half of them went to the 
university in a different state, most of the time to a neighbouring one or to Delhi. 
[24] To help expose the probationers to the cultural diversity of their country, artists from 
various parts of India are invited to the Academy to perform music, dance and theater 
programmes. Moreover, village visits are organised to sensitise the officer trainees to the reality 
of rural India, since most of them have never lived in a village. They also go for a ten-day trek in 
the Himalayas in small autonomous groups. The objective of this tough expedition is to 
strengthen their esprit de corps, despite their linguistic, religious or caste differences. Last but not 
least, they are sent on a two-month study tour throughout India, which is the biggest exposure to 
the immensity and diversity of their country that most of the probationers ever had. This trip is 
intended to give them an all-India perspective and a global picture of the territory they are going 
to administer. After completion of the course in the Academy, the IAS probationers are sent to the 
districts for a one-year practical training in the state to which they have been assigned11. Then 
they go back to the Academy for two more months in order to compare their respective 
experiences in the field and to report to the faculty members about the administration problems 
they have come across. 
[25] By observing the behaviour of the probationers during these different stages of their 
training and discussing with them, one can point out the shortfalls of social and regional 
integration within the IAS. In the Academy, although it is possible to make the probationers 
mingle in the hostels, it is not the case in the canteen. Vegetarians, generally Brahmins or upper-
caste people, eat apart from non-vegetarians. Besides, each regional group, speaking a common 
language, usually sit together at a table. 90% of the interviewed probationers admit that the 
groups are formed most often according to ethno-linguistic origin, and non-Hindi speakers, 
especially South Indians, are criticised for being clannish and chauvinistic about their mother 
tongue. But one should not draw general conclusions from this regional groupism, which is quite 
natural. A more disquieting feature is the favouritism shown by some faculty members to the 
probationers coming from their state, according to the statement of many officer trainees. 
[26] Communal tensions rarely occur in the Academy. Forming a tiny minority, Muslim 
probationers adopt a low profile, but they sometimes have to face remarks about Hinduism being 
                                                
11 This period of training in the field is the subject of Chatterjee’s novel, English August, a humorous 
portrayal of a typical urban, English-educated IAS officer, who discovers with disillusionment and boredom 
the Indian realities in a remote rural district (Chatterjee 1988). 
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the true cement of national unity or questioning the loyalty of Muslims to the Indian nation. Within 
the IAS, the influence of Hindu nationalist movements is much more prevalent than is openly 
admitted. One of the most famous coaching centres preparing for civil service examination 
(‘Sankalp’) is entirely funded by the RSS, an anti-Muslim organisation, which thus controls a 
powerful tool to propagate its ideology within the future elites of the administration. The 
importance of communalism in the higher civil service appeared clearly during the 2002 riots in 
Gujarat, which cost the lives of more than a thousand Muslims. The paralysis of the 
administration and its failure to contain the pogrom revealed the silent complicity of some 
politicians and bureaucrats with the Hindu fundamentalists (D’Souza 2002). 
[27] Casteism is not very apparent in the Academy, but it is still a reality that weighs in 
the career of IAS officers once in the field. In the Academy, untouchability is not any more an 
open practice like in the 1950s and 1960s, when some lower-caste officers chose to resign 
because of the prejudices they had to face (Singh 1964). Now it is a much more subtle practice, 
which is often self-imposed. Many lower-caste probationers prefer to keep aloof from others in 
order not to face the scornful attitude of some of their colleagues. Conflicts are never open, 
unless a particular incident happens. When, for example, a group of probationers organised the 
birthday celebration of the untouchable leader Ambedkar in the Academy, the deliberate absence 
of some of their upper-caste colleagues created some tensions. Once posted in the field, caste 
often plays a part in transfers and promotions12. The competition between IAS officers is fierce, 
since only a minority can reach the higher posts of the administration, in the Secretariat and in the 
ministries. Merit and seniority are not the only considerations in career advancement. Disguised 
discrimination is a common practice and incompetent officers are sometimes promoted only 
because of their caste identity. 
[28] Casteism, communalism and regionalism affect the performance of the higher 
administration. The divisions in Indian society are not only reflected in the ranks of the 
bureaucracy, but because of the partiality of some of its members, the bureaucracy might also 
contribute to reinforcing social divisions. The Gujarat example has shown how the inaction of the 
police and of the administration can cost the lives of thousands of people. Similarly, the press 
reveals sometimes how the perpetrators of atrocities against untouchables are not prosecuted in 
the districts where the Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate prefer to turn a blind 
                                                
12 ‘While transfers in the 1960s were more a matter of administrative routine, they are now increasingly 
being ordered on the basis of caste, influential networks and political loyalties’ (Banik 2001: 111). 
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eye to those matters. Moreover, caste favouritism leads to unequal allocation of resources and to 
misappropriation of government funds at the expense of the target groups, that is, the 
underprivileged sections of society. To explain this practice, the bureaucrats accuse local 
politicians of pressuring them to serve as a priority their ‘clients’, that is their specific electorate. 
As a young Collector admits: ‘If a Minister or a local MLA13 gives me 10 names which should be 
considered first for the distribution of a government scheme, I have to accept at least 5 of them, 
only then can I serve those who really need this scheme and who are eligible for it’. 
[29] This being said, there is one striking feature observed in the Academy that can 
contribute to fostering national integration is a trend of inter-religious, intercaste and interregional 
marriages among officers. IAS women generally prefer to marry another officer within the 
profession, because, as some of them explain, ‘it is otherwise difficult to find a husband who 
would accept his wife having a more prestigious job than his’. This social ‘homogamy’14 is less 
strong among IAS men, since they are aware of their value on the matrimonial market. They can 
get a huge dowry by marrying the daughter of a rich industrialist, a powerful politician or a senior 
bureaucrat. Dowry was officially forbidden in 1961 (Anti-Dowry Act), but it seems to be a growing 
phenomenon. The amount varies according to the occupation of the husband and to his caste. 
[30] In India, it is widely considered that IAS officers occupy the highest position on the 
dowry market. 40% of the interviewed officers declared that they were offered more than ten 
crores (hundred millions) of rupees as a dowry, especially in the form of immovable property, but 
only half of them admitted that they actually took it. In these conditions, one may assume that 
those who can afford to have an IAS as a son-in-law are mostly well-off businessmen or corrupt 
politicians and bureaucrats. The officers use this fact to elevate their social status through 
marriage. Coming generally from the middle class, most of them marry in the upper classes of 
society. The dowry they get is sometimes so huge that they can recycle part of it to marry their 
sisters to good matches and thus elevate the position of the whole family. These practices are all 
the more illegal as black money is often used for dowry (what bureaucrat or politician can 
honestly earn the millions spent on his daughter’s marriage with a monthly salary of only tens of 
thousands rupees?). Dowry is in a way the first bribe that a male IAS gets in his career. It is 
offered to him by a rich and powerful family in exchange for services (‘I can help my people to get 
                                                
13 Member of the Legislative Assembly. 
14 ‘Homogamy’ is the term used by Bourdieu (1989) and other sociologists to describe marriages within the 
same profession. 
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their work done’, says one of them). Through his title, the IAS officer can also give his in-laws the 
social recognition and respectability that they lacked despite their wealth. 
[31] Between 2001 and 2005, among 170 IAS officers on whom marriage data could be 
collected, 45% had a typical arranged marriage, within the caste, and generally with dowry. 40% 
made a love marriage, most of the time without dowry, and without consideration of caste, creed 
or region. This proportion is much higher than the national average, since in India the immense 
majority of marriages are arranged by the families within the same caste. IAS women usually do 
not give dowry, so marriages between officers are either love marriages or cadre-based 
marriages. The All-India Services follow a cadre system wherein the officers are allotted various 
states (cadres) during their probationary period, to which they remain affiliated throughout their 
career. Getting married to another member of the All-India Services with a ‘better’ cadre is the 
only way to change one’s state of allotment by joining the spouse’s cadre: this is called cadre-
based marriage. They represent 15% of the marriages on which information was given. The 
career of an IAS can indeed vary considerably according to the state cadre to which one has 
been assigned, where the officer has to stay most of his or her professional life. Some of them 
are posted very far from their home state or in ‘inhospitable’ places, and they are therefore ready 
to do anything to get a ‘better’ cadre. One young lady officer posted in the North-East explains 
her marriage plans: ‘My parents wanted me to marry within the caste, but now a cadre-based 
marriage is the only option for me. No well-settled man from my community would leave 
everything and go with me to the North-East. Life is difficult there, even for me. To be transferred, 
I have no choice but to marry an officer from the All-India services. I still have to find somebody 
with a good posting who would accept to take me out of my cadre, but he might be neither from 
my caste nor from my state’. 
 
IV. Cadre allocation:  fostering spatial mobility 
[32] The IAS is an All-India Service that ensures an equitable mix of ‘insider’ and 
‘outsider’ officers in each state. Half of the vacancies go to officers who come from the state, and 
the other half to officers from other regions. Among insiders, 33% are promoted from the State 
Civil Service. There are thus few home cadre vacancies for the IAS officers directly recruited 
through the national examination, which is why most of them are posted to a state different from 
their native one. It is a deliberate policy, which aims at encouraging the spatial mobility of high-
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level civil servants and at promoting national integration by giving the officers an all-India outlook. 
The objective is also to break down local patron-client networks and avoid parochial pressures on 
administrators, who are continually exposed to forces drawing sustenance from caste, religion, 
region, language. It is easier not to succumb to these demands for ‘outsiders’, who are usually 
more immune to them and more neutral than ‘insiders’. 
[33] But some state governments are not keen on receiving civil servants ‘imposed’ by 
the central government, especially since the end of the Congress hegemony and the emergence 
of opposition regional parties. The pan-Indian character of the IAS is sometimes considered 
incompatible with the federal principle, an erosive force acting against the autonomy of the states, 
while its members are viewed as the agents of the central government in the regions. Between 
1975 and 1977, during the National Emergency declared by Indira Gandhi, high-level civil 
servants zealously collaborated with the authoritarian regime15, which made them suspect in the 
eyes of state politicians (Appu 2005). In 1977, in a memorandum on centre-state relations, the 
communist government of West Bengal stated that the All-India Services must be abolished. 
Eight years later, three other states (Tamil Nadu, Tripura and Punjab) expressed the same view. 
But the issue of dismantling the All-India Services was never seriously considered by the central 
government because the principle of the integrative role of national bureaucracy has prevailed up 
to now. 
[34] The All-India Services are jointly controlled and managed by the Centre and the 
States. The central government, through the Ministry of Personnel, has a considerable say in the 
careers of IAS officers. A system of rotation enables the civil servants to work successively in the 
state of their allotment and at central level in New Delhi. The first ten years are usually spent in 
the districts, at the grass roots level, until the officers reach the position of Collector (also called 
District Magistrate). Then they can ask for a deputation to the Centre. Back to their cadre, they 
usually stay in the state capital and work in the Secretariat. The highest office they can hold at the 
regional level is that of Chief Secretary, a rank that only a few reach. 
[35] In the states, the Chief Minister, at the head of the regional government, possesses a 
triple prerogative on IAS officers: he can transfer them from one district to another, promote and 
suspend them. Transfers are a normal feature in personnel administration, according to the 
                                                
15 ‘Evidence which appeared in the Shah Commission of Inquiry Reports after the Emergency suggests 
that most IAS officers in the Secretariat and districts (...) accepted orders they believed to be improper and 
politically motivated’ (Potter 1996: 156). 
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Weberian concept of separation of the incumbent from the office he is holding. They prevent the 
growth of excess ‘embeddedness’ (Evans 1992) in local society by creating some distance 
between the administrators and the public. But some minister-politicians misuse their power and 
try to make non-submissive bureaucrats pliable by transferring them to ‘punishment’ postings, in 
remote or insurgency-affected areas. This phenomenon helps to explain the collusion of interests 
between corrupt bureaucrats and politicians. Some IAS officers use intense lobbying and offer 
bribes to their political masters in order to secure a lucrative or ‘plum’ posting, through which they 
can easily reimburse themselves thanks to the discretionary power vested in it and to the large 
resources at their disposal (Wade 1985, Arora and Radin, 2000). As early as 1964, the 
Santhanam Committee Report pointed out the connection between transfers and corruption. The 
increase in allegations of corruption against IAS officers is reflected in the Central Vigilance 
Commission reports (Government of India 2001), and brings disrepute to the once famed and 
sacrosanct office16. The IAS has consequently fallen steeply in public esteem. 
[36] Despite the nexus between politicians and bureaucrats, the latter are always in a 
precarious position since they can be arbitrarily transferred at any time, especially if they threaten 
certain local vested interests (Banik 2001). Quoting the example of the Gujarat anti-Muslim riots,  
D’Souza (2002) observes: ‘Perversely, officers of integrity who, in applying the law diligently, act 
against offenders aligned with the ruling party in the government, suffer the harassment of 
repeated transfer’. Whenever there is a change of government in the states, the civil servants 
have to face large scale transfers. Uttar Pradesh, with a dozen changes of government between 
1977 and 1999, is considered to be the state where the average tenure of the administrators is 
the shortest and where mass transfers have been largely institutionalised17. This chronic 
instability affects the performance of the administration, which needs continuity to achieve 
organisational objectives. 
[37] ‘Political interference’, as bureaucrats name it, varies from state to state. In the 
Indian federal set-up, the state governments differ largely in terms of political and administrative 
                                                
16 Forster, in his novel A Passage to India, written in 1924, reminds us with much humour that the British 
civil servants working in India were not more incorruptible than Indian civil servants, but they were less 
easily caught: ‘When we poor blacks take bribes, we perform what we are bribed to perform, and the law 
discovers us in consequence. The English take and do nothing. I admire them’ (Forster 2005: 6). 
17 In Uttar Pradesh, Chief Minister Kalyan Singh transferred 293 IAS officers between July 1991 and 
December 1992. His successor, Mulayam Singh Yadav transferred 321 IAS between December 1992 and 
June 1995, and Mayawati 284 IAS between June and October 1995 (‘UP-wardly Mobile’, The Indian 
Express, 2 July 1998). 
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culture. This is one of the criteria that IAS officers take into account when they talk of ‘good’ or 
‘bad’ cadres. In the Academy, it is a common topic of conversation and it is interesting to study 
the perception of the Indian territory by its administrators. Which state they are allotted is a very 
important issue for them and carries enormous personal meaning because their entire careers 
are at stake. Cadres are allotted randomly in order to treat all the states equally. Recruitment and 
random cadre allocation on a national basis is a way to promote national integration, since the 
smaller or less developed states may not be able to attract highly qualified civil servants to their 
territory. Merit is taken into account only for home cadre allocation, since most IAS officers wish 
to be posted in their own state. 
[38] 95% of the interviewed IAS put their home state as a first choice when asked: ‘If you 
could choose your cadre, what would be your first five choices?’. For the next choices, the three 
states that were most frequently mentioned were Maharashtra, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. 
These states are generally considered as ‘good cadres’ because they are big and among the 
most developed of India. But the development level of a state comes into consideration both 
ways, since comparatively backward states like Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh 
offer different types of advantages to the officers, especially in terms of prestige and power. 
According to one probationer, ‘in these ‘feudal’ states, IAS officers are considered as Ma-Bap18 of 
the people, if not as demigods. Moreover, illiterate people don’t create as much trouble as the 
educated, like in Kerala where people know their rights and keep on fighting for them’. This can 
explain why backward states are also frequently mentioned in the list of cadre wishes (Figure 3). 
                                                
18 Mother and father. 
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[39] Figure 4 is based on the answers of the interviewed IAS on their last five cadre 
choices. It appears clearly on this map that the least sought-after cadres are all peripheral states. 
The North-Eastern states are considered as ‘bad cadres’ because of their distance from the 
mainland, lack of accessibility, but also because of their strong ethnic identities and the political 
troubles created by separatist insurgents.One IAS from Andhra Pradesh, who was alloted Assam, 
remembers his family’s reaction when they came to know about it: ‘When I told my mother that I 
was posted in Assam, she started crying. I asked her why. She said that the only time she heard 
about Assam was in a Telugu movie in which the hero punishes the villain by putting him in a 
train to Assam’. It is also due to security problems that civil servants prefer to avoid the Kashmir 
cadre. Bihar is considered as a ‘bad cadre’ because of the collapse of governance and the 
chaotic administrative structure of this state (see also Appu 2005). There is a general feeling 
among IAS officers that Kerala, a communist-governed state for many years, does not give them 
much power. The population of that state, the most educated and unionised of India, in the words 
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of the interviewed probationers, ‘gives no more respect to IAS officers than to clerks’, which is 
rather irritating for this elite body of the administration. 
[40] Some states are deficit cadres because of the disaffection of IAS officers, especially 
in the North-East, where some postings remain vacant in the higher administration19. Civil 
servants adopt diverse strategies to avoid going to these states, ranging from marriage to political 
intrigues. The officers who are already engaged or married when joining the service can adopt 
temporary strategies to escape from their cadre. After a compulsory period spent in the field, they 
can ask for a deputation to the central government in Delhi. Power and patronage being 
concentrated in the national capital, there is a rat race among IAS officers to join important 
ministries (Mukherjee 1994). In fact, those appointments are monopolised by a small number of 
IAS officers with the right connections and good political backing20. High-level civil servants can 
also go abroad for a couple of years, and some of them even get prestigious postings in the UN 
or WTO. IAS officers thus spend a lot of time building their careers and improving their service 
prospects, some of them thereby neglecting their jobs in the field and the dire needs of the states 
deserted by the higher administration. 
[41] The supporters of the integrative role of the IAS quote examples of civil servants who 
get acclimatised to their cadres, not bothering to move to the centre, even settling down in their 
adoptive state after retirement. But this occurs only in the states which have big metropolises 
where the living standards are good and access to medical facilities easy. It also happens with 
officers who amassed wealth during their career in the form of landed estates, houses and even 
industries (sometimes disproportionate to their known sources of income21). Yet, in the North-
Eastern states, IAS officers cannot buy any real estate (according to a law which protects tribal 
lands), and they probably do not wish to do so, since most of them prefer to go back to their 
home state after retirement. The North-East case, where secessionist movements are still active, 
points out the limitations of the national integration policy through the higher civil service. Neither 
are the IAS officers willing to serve the local people from whom they feel alienated by a wide 
                                                
19 In 2002 for example, there were 7 vacancies in Manipur-Tripura, and only 3 in Uttar Pradesh. 
20 ‘It is only a small number of nearly 300 officers who keep hovering around Delhi out of the total 
membership of nearly 5,000 and who act as gate-keepers preventing their other colleagues from getting 
central postings’ (Maheshwari 2005: 139). 
21 ‘In both the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service there are about 15% officers in 
senior age-groups who are multimillionaires’ N.S. Saksena, of Indian Police (quoted in Maheshwari 2005: 
151). 
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cultural and ethnic gap, nor these populations accept to put their destiny in the hands of agents of 
an external power that, according to them, tries to dominate and assimilate them. 
 
Conclusion 
[42] The argument that the IAS serves to promote the unity and integrity of the Indian 
nation, transcending cleavages and differences which form the basis for states’ identities, seems 
much less convincing in the contemporary situation than it might have been at Independence. 
The contribution of the All-India Services to cementing or safeguarding the Union cannot be 
reckoned as crucial, compared with the historical, political and cultural factors which make 
Indians feel that they belong to the same nation, whatever their differences. The efforts to make 
the higher civil service more representative through reservations are limited to a purely 
quantitative approach to national integration, and do not transcend the social, religious and ethnic 
cleavages that divide Indian society. How could an elite administration itself affected by casteism, 
communalism and regionalism offer the perspective of a collective quest for common goals? 
Vertical solidarity between bureaucrats and politicians seems to prevail over the horizontal 
solidarity of a composite body of IAS officers, who align themselves with political parties on a 
caste basis, or simply for opportunist motives of career advancement.  
[42] Some upright IAS officers resist this trend, but they cannot alone change a system 
which victimises them through harassment and pressures from local politicians, frequent punitive 
transfers and threats to their families. To put an end to this abuse of power, the current 
Manmohan Singh government has decided to limit the prerogatives of Chief Ministers with regard 
to All-India civil servants22. But in a democratic set-up, politicians will continue to be at the helm of 
affairs. If they do not find political incentives in reforming public service institutions towards 
achieving good governance, any alternative institution, however well designed in theory, is likely 
to face similar pressures. 
[43] That is why the abolition of the All-India Services23, which have not proved efficient in 
fulfilling national integration policies, does not constitute a solution in itself. It would lead to the 
                                                
22 ‘In a big push to governance reforms, the Manmohan Singh government has finally notified the fixed 
tenure rule for All-India Service officers posted in the states. Now, a committee headed by the Chief 
Secretary has to approve any decision to transfer a bureaucrat before his minimum tenure is over’, 
Hindustan Times, September 14 2006. 
23 See Venkataratnam, 2005. 
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preeminence of the State Civil Services, which are considered to be even more parochial in 
outlook. Reforming the IAS is neither an easy task. Successive commissions for administrative 
reforms have submitted reports and recommendations over the years, without bringing any 
fundamental change to the institution. The IAS officers form a powerful lobby at the national level, 
and they will certainly resist any proposal that threatens their position, even when the objective is 
to make them more accountable to the public, especially by removing the constitutional protection 
given to them. The officers who fail in their mission of public service, the openly corrupt, the 
partisan, still enjoy the security of tenure guaranteed to them by the Constitution, which makes 
their dismissal very difficult. 
[44] The elitist character of the higher civil service was supposed to ensure the probity of 
its members and to put them above special interests. But today some Indian commentators admit 
that ‘we have been expecting too much from the bureaucracy because it was elitist. Elitism is not 
synonymous with neutralism or with fair play’ (Venkataratnam 2005). The partisanship of high-
level civil servants goes against their mission of national integration. If nothing is done to increase 
the effectiveness of the IAS as a binding force of the country, and if, instead of contributing to 
national unity, its members deepen even more the existing social cleavages by their partiality, 
then the whole institution loses its raison d’être. 
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